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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERVIN R. REID and ETHNA R. 
REID, 
Respondents. 
vs. 
MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and UNITED BENEFIT 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 19678 
BACKGROUND FACTS PERTINENT TO THIS PETITION 
1. • The Defendants, hereinafter referred to as Mutual, 
leased 60% of the main floor of Plaintiffs1 premises, (R. 
4 03) and were required to use a common entryway and hallway 
with Intermountain Marketing, (Exhibit 42-d). (R. 601, 606) 
2. Intermountain Marketing attracted large groups of 
sales trainees (R. 600) and in the process of interviewing, 
training and motivating the various trainees engaged in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
practices which included: 
a. The serving and consumption of refreshments in the 
halls during break time. (R. 543, 590-591, 625-626, 672) 
b. Setting up registration tables in the hallway. (R. 
522-523, 589-590, 606, 672) 
c. Permitting the trainees to engage in practice 
sessions with one another in the halls during break times. 
(R. 544, 626, 716) 
d. Permitting large numbers of trainees and 
salespersons to overload the bathrooms, smoke, put lipstick 
on the wall, (R. 675) fill the sinks with paper towels, 
extinguish cigarettes on the floors and in the toilets, and 
consume all the paper service making the bathrooms unsuitable 
on frequent occasions for the Defendants or their clients to 
use. (R. 441, 445-446, 544-546, 548-549, 607, 643-644, 672-
673, 675-676, 712, 723-724) 
e. Permitting boxes of merchandise to remain in the 
halls to be sold or delivered to salespersons and/or 
customers of Intermountain Marketing. (R. 462, 522-523, 592-
593, 728) ["The hallways. ..looked like a warehouse.11] (R. 
518) 
f. Permitting employees of Intermountain Marketing to 
direct clients of Mutual into the Intermountain Marketing 
2 
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sales and training sessions. (R. 447, 521-522, 543, 586-590) 
g. Permitting the instructors of Intermountain 
Marketing to engage in extremely noisy and disturbing 
activities which included: 
(1) Count down drills in which the participants 
would count down backwards, shouting out loud, in 
unison from the number ten to the number one, 
followed by the shout "I feel great!", followed by 
loud clapping, cheering, and the stamping of feet. 
(R. 439-440, 447-448, 450, 525, 534, 542, 604-605, 
620, 624-625, 632, 670, 712, 715-716, 721, 723, 
727) 
(2) Loud laughter and clapping on a periodic 
basis. (R. 465, 525-527, 609, 623, 624) The 
throwing of a pie in the face of someone present to 
get the trainees to scream with laughter. (R. 524-
525) 
(3) Playing loud stereo music, (rock, new wave, 
etc.) every day to establish an atmosphere as the 
young trainees would come to their office. (R. 
528, 615-616, 624, 669-670) 
3. Mutual was separated from Intermountain Marketing 
by semi-portable walls called "ultra-walls" installed over 
3 
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the carpet, (R. 449), with insufficient insulation to 
insulate Mutual's premises from the noise emanating from the 
Intermountain Marketings1 premises. (R. 511, 642-643) The 
ceilings were suspended ceilings which were not insulated 
between offices. (R. 526) 
4. When the noise and disturbances would emanate from 
Intermountain Marketing's premises, Mutual would have to 
terminate their activities until the disturbance would cease, 
and either stop or delay their telephone conversations and/or 
stop or delay their sales presentations to their clients. 
(R. 526-527, 727-728) 
5. The disturbances continued or increased so that 
just prior to the time that Mutual vacated the premises, 
Mutual's secretaries and personnel were becoming upset (R. 
671); and, although the most important function of the office 
was sales, Mutual could no longer use the offices to make 
sales presentations. Ninety percent of the business Mutual 
conducted at their offices consisted of interviews with 
clients. (R. 513, 649) Mutual's salespersons stopped 
bringing their clients and prospective clients into the 
office for fear of loss of sales which would occur as a 
result of the problems in the halls, and the noise and 
outbursts. The salespersons began to conduct all their 
4 
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business outside of the office to avoid the embarrassment 
and potential loss of sales, (R. 659-660, 664-665, 712-713, 
718) Mutual was regularly embarrassed by the outbursts of 
noise and cheering and it was necessary for Mutual to make 
explanations to pacify their clients. (R. 527, 532, 579, 
671-672, 716, 728) 
6. The Intermountain Marketing trainees and 
salespersons who would attend the meetings which were held 
three days a week every week, (R. 602, 603) would completely 
fill the entire parking lot, overflow to the street, fill all 
the available nearby street parking and would overflow into 
the church parking lot down the street. (R. 446, 520-521, 
641, 679, 766-767) 
7. At least three days a week, during most of the day, 
there were no parking spaces available in the parking lot or 
nearby where either the employees of Defendant or their 
clients could park. (R. 520-521, 608, 669, 674, 724, 729) 
See testimony of Hector Diaz (R. 520-521); Alice Thompson (R. 
669, 674); Verlyn Nelson (R. 674); Blaine Stonebraker (R. 
729); and John Greco of Intermountain Marketing (R. 608). 
8. The only testimony offered by Plaintiffs to rebut 
the detailed testimony presented by Defendants regarding the 
parking was the testimony of Plaintiff Ethna Reid, who 
5 
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basically testified that when she arrived early in the 
morning, from time to time, she would find a parking place in 
the back parking lot, (R. 781) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1. Mutual presented a substantial amount of 
uncontroverted evidence at trial which demonstrated that it 
was constructively evicted. The Utah Supreme Court failed to 
recognize that overwhelming evidence in its majority opinion. 
POINT NO. 2 When the overwhelming, uncontroverted 
evidence is reviewed and compared with Utah case law 
concerning constructive eviction, it must be concluded that 
Mutual was constructively evicted and the decision of the 
trial court must be reversed. 
POINT NO. 3 Plaintiffs breached the lease agreement 
by not providing the parking required by the lease agreement. 
The majority opinion failed to recognize the overwhelming 
evidence which established such breach. 
POINT NO. 4 Mutual was improperly prohibited by the 
trial court from introducing testimony as to the professional 
standard required for its offices, and the Supreme Court has 
failed to recognize this issue. 
POINT NO. 5 The standards for review in cases of 
equity and law are different, but under either standard, 
1 
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Mutual was and is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's 
decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
MUTUAL PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL 
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT HAS OVERLOOKED THE OVERWHELMING 
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE IN ARRIVING AT 
THE MAJORITY OPINION. 
At the trial, Mutual presented substantial , 
uncontroverted evidence and testimony which demonstrated: 
1. That three days each week, after the early morning 
hours, there were no parking spaces available. 
2. That several days a week, the hallways were jammed 
with people, filled with registration tables, refreshment 
tables, and boxes of merchandise. 
3. That several days a week the restrooms were 
unavailable either because of the number of people using 
them, or because of the lack of paper service after the 
enormous use had occurred. 
4. That several days a week the noise emanating from 
the Intermountain Marketing premises, consisting of loud 
music, count down drills, laughter, clapping, stamping of 
feet and yelling was so substantial as to distract, and 
7 
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during certain periods, preclude Mutual from conducting 
business until the disturbance ceased. 
5. That Mutual stopped using the premises to make 
sales presentations to its clients because of the conditions 
which existed at Mutual's offices. 
Since no testimony or evidence was introduced to rebut 
the foregoing facts established by Defendants, it must be 
presumed that the foregoing statement of facts is true, and 
the trial court was obliged to make findings consistent with 
that testimony and evidence. In the majority opinion, the 
Utah Supreme Court has ignored the uncontroverted facts. 
In Bover v. Lianell. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
" . . . The law is well settled that it is the 
duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find 
facts upon all material issues submitted for 
decision unless findings are waived . . . " 
(Id. at 1113.) See also Romrell v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 
N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980) wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that the making of findings is mandatory and may not 
be waived, and failure to make findings on "all material 
issues is reversible error". 
POINT NO. 2 
THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS PROVED AT TRIAL 
COMPEL THE LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT MUTUAL 
WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY EVICTED. 
8 
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The doctrine of Constructive Eviction has long been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. In Barker v. Utah Oil 
Refining Co.. Ill Utah 308, 178 P.2d 386, 388 (1947), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized the common law regarding 
constructive eviction and quoted from Black's Law Dictionary. 
In Thirteenth & Washington STS Corp. v. Nelsen, 123 Utah 
70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
the right of a tenant to claim a constructive eviction where 
the tenant's enjoyment of the premises was substantially 
disturbed. 
In the case at hand the facts are so similar to the 
impact of the facts in Thirteenth & Washington STS. Corp. v. 
Nelsen, 123 Utah 70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953), as to make the case 
controlling law and to compel a conclusion that Mutual was 
constructively evicted. The majority opinion has failed to 
recognize the compelling facts and precedent in this regard 
in the case a hand. 
In Deseret Fed. Sav. v. U.S. Fidel & Guar., 714 P.2d 
1143 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court recognized a 
constructive eviction where it appears as though the 
Interference with enjoyment was equal to or less offensive 
than in the case at hand. 
Mutual's claim of constructive eviction is not only 
9 
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supported by specific controlling Utah Supreme Court case 
law, but is also supported by the case law of many other 
jurisdictions as follows: 
Hannan v. Harper. 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255, 45 A.L.R. 
1119 (192 6), held that the leasing of an upper apartment of a 
two-family flat for the use of a college fraternity 
constituted a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 
Millbridcre Apartments v. Linden, 151 N.J. Super. 168, 376 
A. 2d 611 (1977), held that the Reste principle relating to 
constructive eviction could be applied to a situation similar 
to that before us where the tenants frequently complained to 
their landlord that their neighbors were extremely loud. 
Gottdiener v. Mailhot, 179 N.J. Super. 286, 431 A.2d 851 
(1981) , held that the failure of a landlord to prevent 
adjacent tenants from making excessive amounts of noise 
constituted constructive eviction. Bruckner v. Helfaer, 222 
N.W. 790 (Wis. 1929), held that too much noise from an 
adjacent tenant caused a constructive eviction of the tenant. 
Wade v. Herndl, 127 Wis. 544, 107 N.W. 4 (1906), held that 
shaking and vibration caused by acts of an adjacent tenant 
constituted a constructive eviction. Lay v. Bennett, 4 Colo. 
App. 252, 35 P. 748 (Colo. 1894) held that the leasing of a 
portion of the premises for the purpose of prostitution 
10 
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constituted a constructive eviction of the neighboring 
tenant. Maple Terrace Apartment Co, v. Simpson, 22 S.W.2d 
698 (Texas 1929) , held that the act of a co-tenant in keeping 
a dog in its apartment contrary to the provisions of the 
lease prohibiting the keeping of animals on the premises and 
the failure of the landlord to take such action as was 
required to remove the dog from the premises constituted 
constructive eviction of the complaining tenant. 
In the case at hand, the uncontroverted evidence compels 
the conclusion that the interference with Mutual1s use of the 
premises equalled or exceeded the interference demonstrated 
in Thirteenth & Washington (supra). 
POINT NO. 3 
PLAINTIFFS BREACHED THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
BY NOT PROVIDING THE REQUIRED ALLOTTED 
PARKING. 
In the case at hand, the lease agreement provided for a 
specific number of parking spaces which were to be allocated 
to Mutual. The applicable provisions of the lease agreement 
are as follows: 
"8. Parking: Landlord shall provide off-
street parking for 12 automobiles. In the event 
that parking is reserved in the covered parking 
area, tenant will be allotted his proportional 
share in addition to access to all non-covered, 
unreserved parking that is available for all 
tenants use." 
11 
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Plaintiffs did not take any action to assure Mutual1s 
use of their allotted parking space. Plaintiffs did not even 
bother to designate parking spaces. Plaintiffs1 failure to 
take any action to provide the necessary parking spaces for 
Mutual was in direct breach of the lease agreement 
specifically requiring the allocation of parking spaces for 
Defendants1 use. 
The Utah Supreme Court has entirely ignored Mutual's 
claim of breach of the lease agreement, even though Mutual 
established the breach by substantial, uncontroverted 
evidence. , 
POINT NO. 4 T 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
PERMIT DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE TESTIMONY 
AS TO THE STANDARDS TO BE MAINTAINED BY 
DEFENDANTS IN THEIR LEASED PREMISES. 
Thirteenth & Washington STS. Corp. v. Nelsen, 123 Utah 
70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953), indicates that premises were to be 
fit for the purpose for which they were leased so as to be 
conducive to the conduct of their business in a professional 
manner. 
The trial court refused to permit Tony Supancic from 
Mutual's national headquarters, to testify concerning the 
standards which Mutual maintains and requires nationwide 
i 
concerning their leasehold premises. Tony Supancic handled 
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all leasing agreements for Mutual and had negotiated and 
concluded the lease agreement which is the subject matter of 
this action. The Utah Supreme Court has failed to address 
and properly resolve this issue. 
POINT NO. 5 
THE CASE AT HAND INVOLVES A QUESTION OF 
EQUITY. THE STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF EQUITY NOT ONLY 
PERMIT, BUT ALSO COMPEL THE APPELLATE 
COURT TO REVIEW THE FACTS AND THE 
EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE IF THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DETERMINED THE FACTS AND 
APPLIED THEM TO THE CASE AT HAND. 
In Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 
177, 308 P.2d 954 (1957), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"This being a case in equity, it is our 
responsibility to review the evidence. . . . Where 
there is a conflict in the evidence, the finding of 
the trial court will not be disturbed if the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the finding; 
nor, if the evidence thereon is evenly balanced or 
it is doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor, 
even if its weight is slightly against the finding 
of the trial court, but it will be overturned and 
another finding made only if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against his finding. 
(Id. at 954) 
In accord with Nokes is Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 
287, 351 P.2d 959, (1960), wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that in cases of equity it is the duty and the 
prerogative of the appellate court to review the evidence. 
The Court recognized that if the evidence clearly 
13 
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preponderates against the trial court's findings, the 
judgment must be reversed. See also Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 
2d 244, 342 P.2d 867 (1959). 
The weight of the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the trial court's so-called findings and legal conclusions. 
All the evidence refutes the the trial court's findings and 
conclusions that the circumstances did not constitute a 
constructive eviction. 
The Appellants respectfully submit that the Court may 
properly look at the unrebutted and overwhelming weight of 
the evidence and reverse the decision of the trial court on 
the grounds that the unrebutted and overwhelming weight of 
the evidence was contrary to the trial court's decision. 
Whether the Utah Supreme Court follows the rule of law 
set forth in Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co. , 
(supra) Givan v. Lambeth, (supra), Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 
2d 244,. 342 P.2d 867 (1959), and several previous opinions, 
or the two cases cited in the majority opinion which appear 
to be inconsistent with previous holdings, the result is the 
same. There was no evidence introduced at the trial which 
contraverted the evidence submitted by Mutual as to the 
disturbing actions of Intermountain Marketing, and the lack 
of parking as required by the Lease. The testimony and 
14 
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evidence submitted compels a conclusion that all the facts 
recited by Mutual were established by uncontraverted, 
substantial testimony. When you apply the facts established 
to the law of constructive eviction the compelling conclusion 
is that Mutual was constructively evicted from the premises. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mutual seeks to have the Utah Supreme Court grant 
Mutual's Petition for Rehearing to reconsider its decision 
and to determine that Mutual demonstrated factually and 
legally that it was constructively evicted from the premises; 
and, to determine that the decision of the trial court should 
be reversed and the Complaint of Plaintiffs be dismissed. 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, counsel for Appellant (Mutual) hereby certifies that 
this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and 
not for delay. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
Dated this day of June, 1989. 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
15 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Petition for Rehearing to the following, this 
day of June, 1989. 
Reid Tateoka 
Attorney for Respondents 
500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
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